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The Double Criminality Rule and Extradition: A
Comparative Analysis
Sharon A. Williams*
I. INTRODUCTION
The double or dual criminality rule is one that is more or less uni-
formly applied in principle in extradition law and process on a world-
wide basis. However, the particular construction differs from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction, often quite considerably. The aim of this article is
to sample but a small segment of practice by looking at the law of just
three states: Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States of
America. These three were selected mainly because of historical and
geographical considerations. For example, Canada and the United
Kingdom, along with other Commonwealth countries, have a special
scheme for the so-called "rendition" of fugitive criminals based upon
historical ties. In addition, Canada and the United States, being so geo-
graphically close, are clearly appropriate and necessary partners for ex-
tradition matters. This article will place primary focus on the extradi-
tion law of Canada, and will show that Canada is in the process of
reforming both its rendition and extradition laws.
The purpose of this article is to: first, differentiate between extra-
dition to foreign states and "rendition" between Commonwealth coun-
tries; second, address the differences in approach between interpreta-
tion of extradition treaties and extradition statutes; third, make a
comparative analysis of the laws of the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Canada; and fourth, analyze the interaction between extra-
territorial jurisdiction over criminal offenses and double criminality,
and lastly, to draw some conclusions on the future of the rule of double
criminality in potential new Canadian extradition law.
* Professor of Law and Assistant Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School, York Univer-
sity, Toronto, Canada.
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II. EXTRADITION AND RENDITION: COMPARISONS AND
CONTRASTS
A. Extradition
The basic precept of extradition law, contained in many countries'
extradition statutes and bilateral treaties, is that there must be a
threshold requirement of double criminality, otherwise known as dual-
ity of offenses. Under this doctrine, the offense for which extradition is
sought must be one for which the requested state would in turn be able
to demand extradition. In other words, the offense must be considered
criminal in both states. Double criminality is based upon a reciprocal
characterization of the offenses' and a type of mutuality of obligations2
between states. It is also premised upon the maxim nulla poena sine
lege, or "no punishment without law."3 As one author succinctly stated:
"No person may be extradited whose deed is not a crime according to
the criminal law of the State which is asked to extradite as well as the
state which demands extradition." 4
It is important to note right at the outset of this article that the
double criminality principle has not been viewed as a principle of cus-
tomary international law automatically binding states. Instead, it has
been considered a creature of treaty and statute. One commentator has
argued that double criminality "is not so much a rule of international
law as a consideration based on policy and expediency."" Thus, a fugi-
tive cannot raise the double criminality question as a bar to extradi-
tion if the applicable treaty or statute - or both, depending upon the
1. The reciprocal characterization is perhaps tied into the view of extradition as
a form of mutual assistance in criminal matters between states. See M.C. BASSiOUm,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 324 (1987).
2. M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
314 (1974).
3. 1. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 137-41 (1971); see also
Karle, Some Problems Concerning the Application of the European Convention on
Extradition, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION AMONG EUROPEAN STATES 51
(1970); H. Schulz, The Principles of the Traditional Law of Extradition, in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION AMONG EUROPEAN STATES 7, 12-13 (1970).
4. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 701 (8th ed. 1955).
5. 1 H. VE. HARTLY BOOTH, BRITISH EXTRADITION LAW AND PROCEDURE 50
(1980) (citing O'Higgins, British and Irish Extradition Law and Practice (1961) (un-
published Ph.D. thesis)); see also Brabyn, Exceptional Accusation Cases Under the
Extradition Acts 1870 to 1935, 1987 CRIM. L. REV. 796, 797 n.7.
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forum - is silent. In the famous case of Factor v. Laubenheimer, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the principle is based not
on international law but on treaty.7
In the past, there has been some confusion between the distinct
concept of double criminality and the extraditable offense. Under ex-
isting Canadian law, section 2 of the Extradition Act provides that an
"extradition crime" is one that if committed in Canada or within Ca-
nadian jurisdiction would be one of the crimes listed in Schedule 1 of
the Act." The majority of Canada's extradition treaties which pre-date
the new "no list" approach likewise have a schedule and section 3 of
the Act provides that if there is an inconsistency between the Act and
the treaty, the treaty will prevail. In "list" treaties, the approach is
really two-tiered. The first tier considers whether the offense is listed in
the treaty as extraditable. If the offense is not included in the list in the
treaty, then the analysis is over, and extradition is not possible. How-
ever, if the offense is included in the list, it is necessary to move to the
second tier and consider whether double criminality exists.
In "no-list" treaties, the related principles of criminality of con-
duct and double punishability are of ultimate importance. It has been
aptly put by one author that "[t]he requirement of double criminality
provides the substantive basis needed to ensure that the process shall
not . . . be arbitrary." 9
6. 290 U.S. 276 (1923).
7. Id. at 287, 300. But see I. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 138: "The rule seems to"
be universally established by practice, however, that it could without much doubt be
regarded as a customary rule of international law should the question ever arise as a
result of some chance omission in the wording of a treaty." Shearer's conclusion does
not seem to gel with actual practice. See, e.g., In re Assarsson, 687 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir.
1982); In re Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1980).
8. Extradition Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. E-23, § 2 (1985).
9. M.C. BAssIouNI, supra note 2, at 322. There has been much debate as to the
two potential ways to interpret double criminality. The in concreto, or objective, ap-
proach looks to the exact labelling of the offense and its constituent elements. See 41 R.
INT. DR. PEN. 12 (1970), for resolutions adopted by the 1969 10th Congress of the
International Association of Penal Law, which indicates a preference for the in con-
creto approach. The in abstracto, or subjective, approach looks to the actual criminal
nature of the act without undue preponderance on the label and full identity of the
elements in the states. See C. van den Wyngaert, Double Criminality as a Require-
ment to Jurisdiction, in DOUBLE CRIMINALITY: STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 43
(N. Jareborg ed. 1989) for an example of a preference for the in abstracto approach.
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B. Rendition
The surrender of fugitives to and from parts of the Commonwealth
is called rendition. It has the same basic meaning as extradition but
there are fundamental differences in Canada between its application
under the Fugitive Offenders Act,10 and extradition pursu ant to the Ex-
tradition Act."1 First, no treaties are required for rendition. This is pre-
mised upon the historical connection of the members of the Common-
wealth and the feeling at the inception of the scheme in the late
nineteenth century that the rigid formality and safeguards of the extra-
dition process with "foreign" states were not appropriate or necessary
within Canada.
Second, under Canada's Fugitive Offenders Act, there is no list of
extraditable offenses and no provision for double criminality. Under
section 3 of the Act, the only requirement is that the offense carry a
penalty in the requesting province of at least twelve months' imprison-
ment with hard labor.1 2 Under section 4, the offense does not have to
be criminal in Canada, nor does it have to be punishable in Canada
with at least twelve months' imprisonment with hard labor.13 The argu-
ment to be addressed towards the end of this article is the need to bring
rendition into line with extradition by providing that both rendition and
extradition offer similar safeguards.
III. TREATY INTERPRETATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
The differences in approach between interpretation of extradition
treaties and statutes become apparent when the question considered is
what role extradition actually plays. From an international law per-
spective, it is a treaty matter bearing on the rights and duties of states;
thus, emphasis is placed on inter-state cooperation. From a domestic
law perspective, extradition may be viewed as a part of the criminal
process and is thus necessarily interpreted in a fashion that stresses the
protection of the fugitive's rights.
Generally speaking, the rule fundamental to the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties is that of literal interpretation according to
10. Fugitive Offenders Act, R.S.C. ch. F-32 (1985).
11. Extradition Act, R.S.C. ch. E-23 § 2 (1985).
12. Fugitive Offenders Act, R.S.C. ch. F-32 § 3 (1985).
13. Id. at § 4.
[Vol. 15
Williams
the ordinary meaning of the words used in the text.14 There is also the
essential commitment that treaties are to be interpreted in good faith,
"which is at once psychological and ethical, requiring adherence to or-
dinary meaning and context."15 A treaty must necessarily be inter-
preted in a manner that is calculated to give it effect and content
rather than to deprive it of meaning. 16
Applying this principle to extradition treaties, the approach of
courts in Canada, and certainly in the United Kingdom, has been that
of liberal interpretation to give effect to the treaty. As one commenta-
tor stated, "treaties should receive a fair and liberal meaning and...
in extradition matters the ordinary technical rules of criminal law
should only apply to a limited extent.""u
In Schmidt v. The United States,"' Mr. Justice La Forest made
the following declaration:
I would add that the lessons of history should not be overlooked.
Sir Edward Clarke instructs us that in the early 19th century the
English judges by strict and narrow interpretation, almost com-
pletely nullified the operation of the few extradition treaties then in
existence: see A Treatise Upon the Law of Extradition (4th ed.,
1903), c. V. Following the enactment of the British Extradition
Act, 1870 (U.K.), 33 & 34 Vict., c. 52, upon which ours is mod-
elled, this approach was reversed. The present system of extradition
works because courts give the treaties a fair and liberal interpreta-
tion with a view to fulfilling Canada's obligations, reducing the
technicalities of criminal law to a minimum and trusting the courts
in the foreign country to give the fugitive a fair trial .... 19
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.39/27, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEG. MAT. 679 (1969) (instrument of accession de-
posited by Canada, October 14, 1970, pursuant to Order in Council, P.C. 1979-1339;
entered into force January 27, 1980). Although it has not been ratified by the United
States, the Vienna Convention provisions are considered to the greatest extent to be
declaratory of customary international law. See RESTATEMENT (TMRD) OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF nr UNITED STATES (1987).
15. See S.A. WILLIAMS & A.L.C. DE MESTRAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO ]INTEfINA-
TIONAL LAW 359 (2d ed. 1987).
16. Id; see also M. MCDOUGALL, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 156 (1967).
17. G.V. LA FOREST, EXTRADITION To AND FROM CANADA 57 (2d ed. 1977).
18. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500.
19. Id. at 524. According to section 52 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, see Part I, Constitution Act, 1982, which is Schedule B, Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), ch. 11. Should a treaty provision, as implemented into Canadian law by the
1991]
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In the United States one author has stated that
[w]here a provision is capable of two interpretation; either of
which would comport with the other term of the treaty, the judici-
ary will choose the construction which is more liberal and which
would permit the relator's extradition, because the purpose of the
treaty is to facilitate extradition between the parties to the
treaty.20
The author further observed that "[a]t times the judiciary will inter-
pret terms beyond their actual meaning to encompass their spirit and
intent .... -21 This approach of liberal interpretation of extradition
treaties may be labelled "cooperative," as it responds to the mutual
interests of states in having a flexible extradition process and reciprocal
cooperation.2
Halsbury's Laws of England characterizes this approach as fol-
lows: "The words used in such [extradition] treaties are to be given
their ordinary, international meaning, general to lawyer and layman
alike, and not a particular meaning which they may have attracted in
certain branches of activity in England."2 In the case of Belgium v.
Postlewaite,24 Lord Bridge of Harwich addressed this issue and re-
ferred to the well-known dictum of Lord Russell in In re Arton (No.
2),25 where the latter stated: "In my judgment those treaties ought to
Extradition Act, violate a Charter Right and not be saved by section 1, the provision
will be struck down as would domestic legislation itself. See Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R.
at 518, where Justice La Forest states that "[tihere can be no doubt that the actions
undertaken by the Government of Canada in extradition as in other matters are subject
to scrutiny under the Charter. .. " See also Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 455, 464.
20. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 88 (emphasis added) (citing the rule of
liberal interpretation of extradition treaty terms); see also U.S. v Wiebe, 733 F.2d
549, 554 (8th Cir. 1984); Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1980); In re
Sidona, 584 F. Supp. 1437, 1447 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
21. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 89 (citing L. OPPENHEiiq, supra note 4, at
952-53). This rule was applied in Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300 (2nd Cir.
1984).
22. See C. Warbrick, The Criminal Justice Act 1988. The New Law on Extradi-
tion, 1989 CiuM. L. REV. 4, 5 n.19; see also Bozano v. France, 9 Eur. H.R.R. 297, 326-
7 (ser. A) (1987) (Schermers, J., dissenting).
23. 18 HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND para. 216, at 88 (4th ed. 1977).
24. [1987] 2 All E.R. 985 (H.L.); accord United States v. howe, [1989] 3 All
E.R. 315.
25. [1896] 1 Q.B. 509.
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receive a liberal interpretation, which means no more than that they
should receive their true construction according to their language, ob-
ject, and intent."2
Lord Bridge went on to hold that the judgment in Arton was good
authority for the proposition that the court should not interpret any
extradition treaty, unless so constrained by the language, in a way
which would "hinder the working and narrow the operation of most
salutary international arrangements." 27 It is interesting to note that in
Postlewaite Lord Bridge refers to Lord Widgery's statement in R. v.
Governor of Ashford Remand Centre, ex parte Beese.28 In Beese, Lord
Widgery held that because an extradition treaty is a contract between
two sovereign states, it must be construed as if it were a domestic stat-
ute.29 However, in applying that principle in Postlewaite, Lord Bridge
held that the parties to bilateral extradition treaties have entered into
reciprocal rights and duties for the purpose of bringing to justice those
who have committed grave crimes and thus to "apply to extradition
treaties the strict canons appropriate to the construction of domestic
legislation would often tend to defeat rather than to serve this pur-
pose."30 Thus, in Postlewaite Lord Bridge indicated that we should be
looking for the underlying intention of the high contracting parties in
interpreting the treaty provisions.-3
This emphasis on inter-state cooperation in an era of transnational
and international crime may be seen as conflicting with the protective
function of extradition law. One commentator has made the following
suggestion:
The conflict between the cooperative and protective functions of ex-
tradition law creates a certain tension, something exacerbated by
the different views among States about the exact place of extradi-
tion in the criminal process. To the extent that extradition is seen
[as] simply part of the process of gaining custody of the fugitive,
the protections appropriate are relatively slight and the matter may
be regarded as administrative rather than judicial.3 2
26. Id. at 517.
27. Postlewaite, [1987] 2 All E.R. at 991.
28. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 969.
29. Id. at 973.
30. Postlewaite, [1987] 2 All E.R. at 992.
31. Id.
32. Warbrick, supra note 22, at (footnotes omitted).
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Nova Law Review
The protective side of the extradition procedure clearly lays emphasis
on the penal law aspects and provides for procedural safeguards for the
fugitive.33 The Postlewaite case illustrates a preference for the coopera-
tive approach, and this preference can also be seen in other fairly re-
cent extradition cases dealing with evidentiary issues,3 4 the political of-
fense exception, 5 and the double criminality rule itself. 6
In conclusion, on this issue of interpretation, it appears that courts
in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States have in recent
times emphasized the. cooperative intent of the parties to extradition
treaties when called upon to interpret their provisions. It is only where
the domestic statute is in question that the courts have been more pro-
tective. When the courts have been required to interpret the extradition
legislation, such as the Extradition Act or Fugitive Offenders Act, then
the penal aspects have been stressed and where ambiguities have been
found they have been construed in favor of the fugitive.37 In Regina v.
Governor of Pentonville ex parte Cheng,3 8 in the House of Lords, Lord
Simon of Glaisdale argued that "the positive powers under the Act [i.e.
to extradite] should be given a restrictive construction and the excep-
tions from those positive powers a liberal construction."39 Moreover,
"[s]ince the common law, as so often, favours the freedom of the indi-
vidual, the rules enjoining strict construction of a penal statute or of a
provision in derogation of liberty. . . merely reinforce the presumption
against change in the common law."'40
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATUTES AND CASE LAW
In order to interpret and analyze the direction in which extradition
law is heading, it appears most fruitful to engage in a comparative
33. For a recent case in which the European Court of Human Rights held that
extradition to. Switzerland involved a violation of the European Convention on Human
Rights, article 5(1)(f), see Bozano v. France, 9 Eur. H.R.R. (ser. A) 297 (1987).
34. R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Office ex parte Rees, [1986] 2 All
E.R. 321.
35. Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, [1973] 2 All E.R. 204; Keane v.
Governor of Brixton Prison, [1972] 1 All E.R. 1163.
36. U.S. v. McCaffery, [1984] 2 All E.R. 570; Denmark v. Nielsen, [1984] 2 All
E.R. 81.
37. See In re Aronson, [1989] 3 W.L.R. 436, 466.
38. [1973] App. Cas. 931.
39. Id. at 954.
40. Id.
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study of the status of the law in the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Canada. This comparative study is particularly helpful in
light of the fact that there is a new British statute that has recently
addressed the question under consideration.
A. The United Kingdom
In December 1989 the United Kingdom enacted a new Extradi-
tion Act. For the sake of the following analysis, this section will be
divided into the pre-December 1989 case law - based on the earlier
Extradition Act,4 Fugitive Offenders Act, 2 and Treaties - and the
post-1989 composite statute, for which as of yet there is no judicial
interpretation.
1. Pre-1989 Extradition Act
When discussing the British position on double criminality, per-
haps the best approach is to look at the case law and government docu-
ments leading to the 1989 Act and to comment on them first. In March
1979 the Home Secretary announced the appointment of a Working
Party to review the law and practice of extradition in the United King-
dom. In 1982 this Interdepartmental Working Party produced its Re-
port.43 Regarding the double criminality question, the Report stated
the traditional rule that fugitives should only be surrendered for acts
which are not only offenses against the law of the requesting state, but
which would also constitute offenses against the law of the requested
state if committed within its jurisdiction. 4
The Working Party Report stated that the justification for the
double criminality rule is the basic principle that the fugitive should be
treated by the requested state in the same way as any other person in
its jurisdiction. 5 Therefore he should not be detained or proceeded
against for acts which do not contravene the requested state's criminal
law. It should be emphasized that the double criminality rule, as ex-
41. Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52.
42. Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967, ch. 68.
43. HoME OFFIcE, A REviEw OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF EXTRADITION IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM (1982) [hereinafter REPORT].
44. This double criminality principle was contained in the relevant British stat-
utes at that time: the 1870 Extradition Act, the 1967 Fugitive Offenders Act, and the
1965 Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act.
45. REPORT, supra note 43, at 10.
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pressed in the 1967 Fugitive Offenders Act, had been interpreted differ-
ently from the double criminality provisions in the 1870 Extradition
Act. This will be evident from the analysis of the cases that follow.
In the case of R. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Bud-
long and Kember," it was held that the acts or omissions for which the
extradition request is made should disclose an extraditable offense if
the acts or omissions had occurred in the requested state. This case was
decided under the 1870 Extradition Act, and the double criminality
rule was well articulated by Lord Justice Griffiths. He stated that
double criminality would be satisfied if it is demonstrated "that the
crime for which extradition is demanded would be reccgnized as sub-
stantially similar in both countries [and] that there is a prima facie
case that the conduct of the accused amounted to the commission of
the crime according to English law."14 7
The 1982 Report stated that this was, in the view of the Working
Party, the correct approach.48 According to the Report, the test applied
in Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Gardner, 4 9 a Com-
monwealth rendition case under the 1967 Act, was too stringent.50 In
Gardner, Lord Parker made the following argument:
It seems to me that what is clearly contemplated [in the 1967 Fu-
gitive Offenders Act] is that a request coming forward to the Sec-
retary of State must set out in some form, and no doubt the most
useful form is the warrant or warrants for arrest, the offence or
offences of which the fugitive is accused . . . . Not only must it
supply a general description. . . but it must condescend to suffi-
cient detail to enable the matter to be considered. 5'
The Working Party elaborated that the strictures impos;ed in Gardner
were that "the offence disclosed must be identical, either in its descrip-
tion or in its constituent parts, to the offence named in the
requisition." 52
46. [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1110.
47. Id. at 1122. Note that Lord Griffiths also held that it is the "substance of the
two offences that must correspond, not their precise definitions." Id. at 1120 (citing In
re Arton (No. 2), [1896] 1 Q.B. 509); see also Rex v. Dix, [1902] 18 T.L.R. 231;
Regina v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Ecke, 1974 Crini. L.R. 102.
48. REPORT, supra note 43, at 10.
49. [1968] 2 Q.B. 399.
50. REPORT, supra note 43, at 10.
51. Gardner, [1968] 2 Q.B. at 415 (emphasis added).
52. REPORT, supra note 43, at 10.
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As the two cases indicate, there was a clear disparity in the ap-
proach between these two statutory applications. The later cases also
bear this out. The key case applying the 1870 Extradition Act is In re
Nielsen.53 This case concerned an extradition request from Denmark,
and the House of Lords held that double -criminality need only be
proved when the particular extradition treaty provides for it.54 Lord
Diplock described it as the "exceptional accusation" case.5 5 The 1870
Extradition Act was held to require no more than that the conduct
disclosed in the evidence delivered by the requesting state be an "extra-
dition crime" in the United Kingdom. There are several passages from
the judgment that are worth quoting, as they illustrate quite clearly the
conduct-based approach to double criminality. Lord Diplock, writing
for a unanimous court dismissing Nielsen's appeal, began the opinion
as follows:
It is ... appropriate at this juncture to draw attention to the fact
that, when one is describing crimes committed in a foreign state
that are regarded in the United Kingdom as serious enough to war-
rant extradition of an offender by whom they have been committed,
one is describing the way in which human beings have conducted
themselves and their state of mind at the time of such conduct.
Since conduct of that kind consists of wicked things that people do
in real life it is possible to describe it either in broad generic terms
and using popular language, or in varying degrees of specificity
The 1870 [Act] list uses the former technique ....
So in order to determine whether conduct constitutes an 'extradi-
tion crime' within the meaning of the Extradition Acts 1870 to
1935, and thus a potential ground for extradition if that conduct
had taken place in a foreign state, one can start by inquiring
whether the conduct if it had taken place in England would have
fallen within one of the 19 generic descriptions of crimes in the
1870 list.56
On its own facts Nielsen was not an "exceptional accusation case,"
which resulted in the case being decided by reference solely to whether
the conduct was criminal if committed in England and covered by the
53. [1984] 2 All E.R. 81 (H.L.).
54. Id. at 82.
55. Id. at 89. As to the term "exceptional accusation cases," see Brabyn, supra
note 5, at 796.
56. Nielsen, [1984] 2 All E.R. at 84.
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1870 list.57 The Nielsen case clarified the meaning of section 26 of the
Extradition Act 1870. Section 26 defined an extradition crime as "a
crime which, if committed in the United Kingdom or within United
Kingdom jurisdiction, would be one of the crimes described in the first
Schedule to this Act."58
Until Nielsen it was uncertain what meaning attached to the word
"crime." There were two possibilities. The first was that "crime" re-
ferred to a specific criminal offense under the laws of the requesting
state. The second possibility was that it referred to conduct that is
viewed as criminal. It was this second "conduct" approach that was
adopted by Lord Diplock in Nielsen. As one writer has stated:
It follows that, since the first Schedule provides that the list of
crimes therein is to be construed according to the law existing in
England at the date of the alleged crime, only English law is rele-
vant to the question whether particular, behaviour amounts to an
extradition crime for the purposes of the Act. So far as, the statu-
tory definition of 'extradition crime' is concerned, foreign law is not
relevant at all.59
It is interesting to observe that in Nielsen and in the next case to
be considered, United States v. McCaffery, 0 the House of Lords did
not use the term "double criminality" in any shape or form. It has been
suggested. by one commentator that by not using this term the justices
"sought to disassociate themselves" from the Budlong definition quoted
earlier in this section.61 The commentator goes on to suggest that the
Budlong requirement, "that the foreign crime with respect to which
extradition is requested must be substantially similar to a relevant of-
fence in English Law," was forcefully rejected in Nielsen as having no
justification in the words of the 1870 Act.62 Lord Diplock's rejection of
the double criminality rule is explicit in his use of the expressions "the
57. Id. at 88-89. See J. Crawford, Case No. 5: Government of Denmark v. Niel-
sen, 1984 BmRT. Y.B. INT'L L. 343, reprinted in 48 J. CRiM. L. 373 (1984).
58. Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52.
59. See Brabyn, supra note 5, at 797. In contrast, section 3 of Canada's Extradi-
tion Act refers explicitly to Canada's extradition treaties taking precedence over the
Act in the event of conflict. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The treaties
contain double criminality clauses of varying descriptions.
60. [1984] 2 All E.R. 570 (H.L.).
61. Brabyn, supra note 5, at 798. For a discussion of the Budlong holding, see
supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
62. Brabyn, supra note 5, at 798.
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sobriquet of 'double criminality',"' 3 in Nielsen and "the so-called
double criminality" rule in McCaffery."
In McCaffery, Lord Diplock, again writing for a unanimous House
of Lords, held that the proper test under Nielsen is "whether the con-
duct of the accused, if it had been committed in England, would have
constituted a crime falling within one or more of the descriptions in-
cluded in that list."16 5 However, as Lord Diplock points out, "the pre-
cise matter on which evidence of foreign law would be necessary would
depend on the terms of the particular extradition treaty." 66 Thus, the
cases interpreting the 1870 Extradition Act can best be summed up as
pointing out that proof of double criminality is only necessary where
the Treaty calls for it. In all other cases it is sufficient that the conduct
amounts to an extradition crime in the United Kingdom.
Under the Commonwealth scheme, a different position has been
taken, as alluded to earlier in Gardner.67 Article 12 of the Scheme Re-
lating to the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders Within the Common-
wealth provides that "[t]he return of a fugitive offender will be pre-
cluded by law or be subject to refusal by law. . . if the facts on which
the request for his surrender is grounded do not constitute an offence
under the law of the country or territory in which he is found. '"68
Gardner required correspondence of the crime in both requested
and requesting states. Two writers have made the following suggestion:
As most of the requests to the United Kingdom under the Scheme
emanate from countries enjoying a common legal heritage, little
difficulty arose in the majority of cases in matching the ingredients
of the crimes in both countries. However, in Gardner and a subse-
quent unreported case of R. v. Pentonville Prison, ex parte Myers
63. Nielsen, [1984] 2 All E.R. at 90.
64. McCaffery, [1984] 2 All E.R. at 573.
65. Id. at 573.
66. Id; see also Jennings v. United States, [1982] 3 All E.R. 104, in which the
House of Lords held that evidence was required which would prove, under the criminal
law in force in that part of the United States where the conduct took place, that a
criminal offence occurred subject to the requisite minimum punishability required by
the Treaty. Id. at 113. The emphasis again, as in Nielsen and McCaffery, is on conduct
"rather than the particular packaging of criminal offences." See Brabyn, supra note 5,
at 800.
67. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
68. CrmD. 3008 (London, 1966). See also C. Nicholls & C. Nicholls, The Old
and the New 4 (October 1989) (unpublished paper presented at the Biennial Confer-
ence of the International Bar Association, Strasbourg).
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(1972) No. 293/72, the court refused to order the surrender of
fugitives because the Commonwealth crimes charged related to fu-
ture pretences, as there was no corresponding crime in the United
Kingdom. 9
In Canada v. Aronson,7 ° the issue before the House of Lords was
whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant the trial of the fugitive
in the United Kingdom for what he was alleged to have done in the
requesting state and not simply for what he had appeared to have done
wrong according to English law.71 Lord Bridge of Ha:rwich declared
that he preferred this narrow construction. In fact he stated that "I do
not think that the language of the statute fairly admits of the wide
construction . . . . [I]f the language is ambiguous, the narrow con-
struction is to be preferred in a criminal statute as the construction
more favourable to the liberty of the subject."7 2
The court took the view that there was a basic fallacy in the argu-
ment of the appellants in that there was an attempt to assimilate the
requirements of the 1870 and 1967 Acts. This argument failed, as the
structure and machinery of both Acts is disparate. Lord Bridge stated
specifically:
Nowhere in the 1870 Act is there any provision which has the ef-
fect of imposing a double-criminality rule, though such a rule may
be introduced into the extradition machinery by the provisions of
particular treaties. By contrast . . . [1]egislating to give effect to
the [1967] scheme, it was necessary to provide that a returnable
offence should both fall within one of those broad categories and
satisfy the 'double criminality rule' laid down in cl 10 of the
scheme [relating to the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders Within the
Commonwealth, Cmnd 3008, 1966].71
Lord Lowry, joined by Lords Bridge and Elwyn-Jones, addressed
the impact of extradition cases such as Nielsen upon rendition cases
such as Aronson in the following words:
[T]he appellants here seem to me to have represented to your
Lordship's the paramount position of Nielsen's case, :not only in
69. C. Nicholls & C. Nicholls, supra note 68, at 5.
70. [1989] 2 All E.R. 1025.
71. Id. at 1027.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1028.
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relation to extradition, concerning which it is of course the leading
authority, but also in regard to the return of fugitive offenders
[under the 1967 Act]. . . [S]uch an approach could not validly
be adopted in a fugitive offender's case.74
Lord Griffiths, one of the two dissenting judges, held that the rejection
of the Nielsen test of conduct would make the 1967 Act unworkable.7 5
He did not hesitate to construe the words "act or omission constituting
the offence," set out in section 3(1)(c) of the 1967 Act, as a reference
to the fugitive's conduct.7 6 He went on to state that "I cannot reconcile
the alternative construction with section 3(1)(a), which by its language
shows that what is required is broad similarity, not exact correspon-
dence, of offence . . . . " This sharply divided decision, which held
that Aronson could not be extradited, illustrates the problems in the
double criminality rule when narrowly construed, especially where fis-
cal offenses are concerned.
One final case that has dealt with this issue is that of In re Os-
man, 7 8 which involved a request from the Crown Colony of Hong Kong
under the 1967 Fugitive Offenders Act. As to the double criminality
rule, Lord Parker held as follows:
The double criminality provision of FOA does not require in my
judgment a meticulous and precise identity of wording . . . The
74. Id. at 1048.
75. Id. at 1030.
76. Section 3(1)(c) of the Act provides for rendition of fugitives for ."relevant
offences," as follows:
(1)For the purposes of this Act an offence of which a person is accused or
has been convicted in a designated Commonwealth country or United
Kingdom dependency is a relevant offence if -
(c)in any case, the act or omission constituting the offence, or the
equivalent act or omission, would constitute an offence against the law of
the United Kingdom if it took place within the United Kingdom or, in the
case of an extra-territorial offence, in corresponding circumstances outside
the United Kingdom.
77. Id. Section (3)(1)(a) provides that an offense is a relevant offense if -
in the case of an offence against the law of a designated Commonwealth
country, it is an offence which, however described int hat law, falls within
any of the descriptions set out in Schedule 1 to this Act, and is punishable
under that law with imprisonment for a term of twelve months or any
greater punishment.
78. [1990] 1 All E.R. 999.
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combined effect of Aronson and its predecessors [Gardner and My-
ers] is, in my view, that if the charge as formulated by the request-
ing state would constitute, if proved, an offence here, the offence is
a relevant offence .... 7
2. The 1989 Extradition Act
It is not within the scope of this article to enter into a comprehen-
sive review of the 1989 Act. However, a brief account of its back-
ground will be given and the sections pertinent to this article on double
criminality will be discussed. The 1989 Extradition Act1° consolidates,
with amendments, enactments relating to extradition under the 1988
Criminal Justice Act,"' the 1967 Fugitive Offenders Act,82 and the
1870-1935 Extradition Acts.
The impetus behind the new Act was not only to streamline the
extradition procedure by reducing the multiplicity of legislation, but
also to assist foreign states, particularly in Europe. Under the old law,
the European states had difficulty in obtaining extradition, primarily
due to the prima facie case requirement of sufficiency of evidence. In
fact, "[t]he legislation ha[d] been said to be too protective of the rights
of the fugitives and not sensitive enough to the cooperative needs of
states dealing with international crime and mobile cricminals." 83 The
process of reform can be traced back to the 1982 Report of the Inter-
departmental Working Party, considered earlier in this section." This
was followed by the Green Paper on Extradition in 1985 .85
It should be noted that running through this process was the im-
portant consideration of the necessity of amendment if the United
Kingdom was to become a party to the European Convention on Extra-
dition." In 1986, the White Paper entitled Criminal Justice: Plans for
Legislation8 7 was presented to Parliament. The proposals in these docu-
79. Id. at 1015-1016.
80. Extradition Act, 1989, ch. 33.
81. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch. 33.
82. Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967, ch. 68.
83. [3 CURRENT LAw STATUTES ANNOTATED 33 (1989)]
84. See supra note 43.
85. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department,
1985. CamND 9421.
86. European Convention on Extradition, 1957, E.T.S. No. 24.
87. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department,
CMND 9658.
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ments became legislation in Part I of the 1988 Criminal Justice Act.
However, it was not proclaimed into force immediately. In June 1989,
an Extradition Bill was introduced to consolidate legislation relating to
extradition.88
The new consolidated Extradition Act became effective in Decem-
ber 1989.89 Its language is clearly taken from the earlier statutes,
which are now wholly or largely repealed, 90 and from the recommenda-
tion of the Law Commission Report. In consolidating the earlier stat-
utes, the 1989 Act makes binding, where utilized, the language of the
earlier statutes. It could be argued that the case law interpreting those
statutes should not be of value. However, even though strictly speaking
this might be true, "it would be unrealistic to disregard the case law on
the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 (because it never came into force,
there is no case in law on Part I of the Criminal Justice Act 1988) and,
indeed the consideration of similar language in the Extradition Act
1870. "91
Section 2 of the new act defines "extradition crime." This defini-
tion is radically different from the definitions found in the 1870 Extra-
dition Act and the 1967 Fugitive Offenders Act. Instead, it follows the
mode of Article 2 of the European Convention on Extradition.92 The
first striking feature is contained in Section 2(1)(a). This section de-
fines an "extradition crime" as "conduct" in the territory of a foreign
state, Commonwealth country or colony, which, had it occurred in the
United Kingdom, would constitute an offence punishable with a term of
imprisonment of at least 12 months. Moreover, however the crime is
described in the law of the foreign state, Commonwealth country or
colony, it must be so punishable under that law. This section clearly
follows the conduct-based line taken by the courts in Nielsen98 and Mc-
Caffery, 4 but not that of Aronson.95 Therefore, the narrow construc-
88. For consideration of the Bill and a Report making certain proposals, see The
Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Extradition Bill: Report on the
Consolidation of Legislation Relating to Extradition, Law. Com. No. 182, Scottish
Law Com. No. 119.
89. Extradition Act, 1989, ch. 33. See Hansard, H.L. Vol. 509, cols. 484, 846;
Vol. 510, col. 790; H.C. Vol. 157, col. 1129.
90. See Current Law Statutes Annotated, supra note 83, at 33.
91. Id. at 33-34.
92. See supra note 86.
93. [1984] 2 All E.R. 81.
94. [1984] 2 All E.R. 570.
95. [1989] 2 All E.R. 1025.
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tion of Aronson is dead.98
As to jurisdiction over the offense, section 2(l)(a) refers to the
territory of the requesting state. The British courts could take a broad
view of this basis of jurisdiction in a manner that can b- compared to
the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Libman v. The Queen.7
One British writer has commented: "The practical importance. . . will
depend upon the extension of United Kingdom law, either by the courts
or by legislation, to catch crime with an extraterritorial element."98
Sections 2(l)(b), 2(2), and 2(3) deal with extradition for extra-
territorial offenses. Offenses will be extraditable where "in correspond-
ing circumstances equivalent conduct would constitute all extra-territo-
rial offence against the law of the United Kingdom" punishable by a
minimum of 12 months imprisonment.9 9 Thus, where there is duality of
jurisdictional bases extradition will take place.100 It should be noted
96. The minimum punishability requirement clearly will bring into play more
offenses than before. In particular, fiscal offenses will no longer be excluded, as they
generally had been in the past. But see R. v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magis-
trate, ex parte Secretary of State for the Home Department, [19881 1 W.L.R. 1204;
see also Report, supra note 43, at 12-13. This new approach will take immediate effect
as regards treaties with such a provision. However, with the "old list" variety, that
method will continue until amendment.
97. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178. Evidence of this broad view may alo be seen in In re
Reyat, [CO 1157/88 Q.B.D. 1989]. In Reyat, the court held that the phrase "extra-
territorial offences. refers to cases which are wholly foreign in concept and not those
which merely have a foreign element . " See also R. v. Governor of Pentonville
Prison, ex parte Osman, [1988] Crim. L. R. 611; R. v. Governor of Plentonville Prison,
ex parte Herbage, 84 Crim. App. 149 (C.A. 1987); R. v. Treacy, [1971] App. Cas. 537
(H.L.).
98. C. Warbrick, The Criminal Justice Act 1988: The New Law on Extradi-
tion, 1989 CPUM. L. REV. 4, 8. The comments refer to the Criminal Justice Act, but as
the same provisions appear in the 1989 Consolidation Act, they still stand. See also
LAW COMMISSION, JURISDICTION OVER OFFENCES oF FRAUD AND DIsHoNEsTY WITH A
FOREIGN ELEMENT (1989); Leigh, Territorial Jurisdiction and Fraud, 1988 CalM. L.
REV. 280. For cases in which extradition was refused for lack of jurisdiction, see Gov-
ernor of Pentonville, ex parte Khubchandani, 71 Cr. App. R. 241 (1980); and R.
Harden (1962), 46 Cr. App. R. 90.
99. Supra note 89.
100. See infra notes 101-104 and accompanying text for an analysis of duality of
jurisdiction. Note that this is in accord with the recent pre 1989 Act decision in R. v.
Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Naghdi, [1990] 1 All E.R. 257, where it was
held that under the 1870 Act, the meaning of "within the jurisdiction of the requesting
state" should not be interpreted solely in the sense as it is used by the foreign state,
since this could be regarded by the United Kingdom as an "exhorbitant jurisdiction."
Id. at 265-66.
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that the United Kingdom, much like Canada, utilizes a territorial ap-
proach to criminal jurisdiction,10 1 except with respect to murder com-
mitted by its nationals abroad and offenses under the various interna-
tional terrorism conventions.
Extradition will also take place for extraterritorial offenses (1)
where the nationality of the offender basis of jurisdiction is used by the
requesting state; (2) where the conduct took place outside the United
Kingdom; and (3) if, had it occurred in the United Kingdom, it would
constitute an offence subject to the minimum punishability rule of 12
months. This provision must be read in the light of the fact that many
states in Europe use this active nationality basis.10 2 It must be stressed
that this application is only addressed to the nationality of the offender
as the jurisdictional link with the requesting state. It is contrasted with
the passive nationality principle, which is based on the nationality of
the victim.103
A situation could present itself where a national of State A with
whom the United Kingdom has an extradition relationship commits an
offense in State B under the laws of State A. The conduct may be
lawful in State B. However, extradition will take place if the conduct
would be regarded as criminal if done in the United Kingdom and be
punishable under the minimum punishabili ty rule. One commentator
supports this result by arguing that the "justification is to be found in
the underlying policy of providing an effective response to certain kinds
of international crime. It will eliminate the 'safe haven', e.g. drug deal-
ing or planning terrorist operations, by allowing for the return of per-
sons to the State most affected by the activities."104
B. The United States
Until 1979 all the bilateral extradition treaties of the United
101. See R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Rush, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 165.
102. See Williams & Castel, The Extradition of Canadian Citizens and Sections
1 and 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, XXV CAN. YR. BK.
INT'L. L. 263, 268-69 (1987).
103. It appears that an early version of the Criminal Justice Bill inadvertently
did not so restrict it to active nationality. According to two commentators, the result
would have been "to allow 'long arm' claims of, for example, the United States, which
bases much of its federal jurisdiction on the nationality of the victim, particularly in
the case of banks. This jurisdiction would not be recognized under the new Act." See
C. Nicholls & C. Nicholls, supra note 68, at 12.
104. Warbrick, supra note 98, at 9.
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States used the enumerative method. One writer has commented that
the refusal to go with the no-list approach "stemmed basically from the
multijurisdictional criminal justice system" in the United States.10 5 The
fear in the United States was that the no-list approach would prove
unwieldy in that in every case it would have to be decided what law
determines the extraditibility of the offense.1"6 However, it appears that
recently "the United States Department of Justice has preferred to
adopt the no-list approach, in light of the high cost in time and effort of
updating treaties. 1 0 7
However, where the list approach still exists, the applicable case
law indicates that extradition will not be granted unless the fugitive
(sometimes designated the "relator") is alleged to have committed an
offense listed or described in some way in the applicable treaty. As is
true with most countries' list treaties, there is no detail or definition of
the offenses but simply an identification formula. 10 8 It stands to reason
that to determine this formula, a body of substantive criminal law must
be applied and that body of law is that of the place of arrest. 0 9 In the
now classic case of Collins v. Loisel,110 Justice Brandeis stated:
It is true that an offence is extraditable only if the acts charged are
criminal by the laws of both countries . . . The law does not re-
quire that the same name by which the crime is described in the
two countries shall be the same; nor that the scope of liability shall
be coextensive, or in other respects the same in the two countries.
It is enough if the particular act charged is criminal in both
jurisdictions.""
This opinion dove-tails with the judgment of Chief Justice Fuller in
Wright v. Henkel,"2 where it was held that "it is enough if the particu-
lar variety was criminal in both jurisdictions."'1 3
105. C. Blakesley, International Extradition: An Exercise in Comparative and
International Law 37-38 (December 1989) (unpublished paper, presented at Confer-
ence on Extradition, Siracusa, Sicily).
106. Id. at 38; see e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
107. C. Blakesley, supra note 105, at 38.
108. M.C. BAssIoum, supra note 1, at 336.
109. Id.; see also U.S. v. Stokinger, 269 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1959), affid, 361 U.S.
513 (1959).
110. 259 U.S. 309 (1922).
111. Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
112. 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
113. Id.; see also Gluckman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508 (1910,'.
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Because of the variegated system of criminal jurisdiction divided
between the federal government and the states, certain questions arise
that are peculiar to the United States. For example, should double
criminality be determined by the law of the state in the United States
where the fugitive is found or by the law of the majority of states in the
United States? In Factor v. Laubenheimer,"" the United States Su-
preme Court mentioned that the crime charged was a crime under the
"law of many states, if not Illinois ... ."15 This approach has been
adopted by many courts in the United States.""6 One writer has
summed up the position as follows: "What the Supreme Court in Fac-
tor and subsequent decisions following it appear to hold is that the
judge will determine whether there is a sufficient number of States that
have criminalized the action in question to legitimize his decision. The
obvious defect is uncertainty. '117
In the recent case of United States v. Sensi,1 8 the circuit court of
appeals held that double criminality does not require that the criminal
laws of the requested and requesting states are "perfectly congru-
ent.""' According to the court, this would be an absurdity, based on
the fact that the criminal laws of different states will rarely match ex-
actly.120 It is important to note the part of the judgment dealing with
the fugitive's conduct as criminal. The court referred to the Restate-
ment (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which
states that the requirement for double criminality is that the "acts
charged" constitute a serious offense in both states.1 21 As the court
stated, "[the Restatement makes clear that the focus is on the acts of
the defendant, not on the legal doctrines of the country requesting
extradition. 1 2
114. 290 U.S. 276 (1923).
115. Id. at 300, 303.
116. See, e.g., Theron v. U.S. Marshal, 832 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1987); In re of
Extradition of Russell, 789 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1986); Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843
(1st Cir. 1980); In re Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F. Supp. 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); U.S. v.
Lehder-Rivas, 668 F. Supp. 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
117. C. Blakesley, supra note 105, at 49.
118. 879 F. 2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'g 664 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1987).
119. Id. at 893; see also Oen Yiu-Choy v. Robinson, 858 F. 2d 1400 (9th Cir.
1988); Theron, 832 F. 2d at 492; In re Extradition of Russell, 789 F. 2d 801 (9th Cir.
1986); In re Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
120. Sensi, 879 F.2d at 893.
121. RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED
STATEs § 476 comment d (1987).
122. Sensi, 879 F.2d at 894. See also United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463
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In Reza Emami v. United States,128 a case in which an Iranian
physician was found to be extraditable to West Germany for criminal
insurance fraud offenses, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California held that the keynote was that the sub-
stantive conduct punishable in both states was functionally identical.
Thus, the principle of dual criminality was satisfied.
Pertinent to our discussion and of comparative assistance to Cana-
dian jurisprudential discussion is Quinn v. Robinson,124 where the cir-
cuit court of appeals held that "[tihe question whether the offense
comes within the treaty ordinarily involves a determination of whether
it is listed as an extraditable crime and whether the conduct is illegal in
both countries. 125
One author has noted that "a few decisions have more carefully
analyzed the elements of the offense against those listed. in the treaty
and denied extradition.1 128 He adds that "[1]ack of treaty coverage has
been a difficulty for the United States in seeking to extradite for pecu-
liar offences like mail fraud, wire fraud, interstate transportation of
stolen goods, or securities law violations, none of which are listed in any
extradition treaties entered into prior to World War I.''t21
C. Canada
1. The No-List Approach
The recent treaties and protocol that Canada has negotiated with
India, France, Germany, the Philippines and the United States respec-
tively indicate that Canada has opted for the no-list approach, which
determines extradition on the basis of double criminality and a mini-
mum punishability requirement rather than on an enumerated schedule
of offenses in the treaty. This will prevent outmoded lists. However, it
(11th Cir. 1988).
123. 834 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1987).
124. 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
125. Id. at 791.
126. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEo. L.J. 1444,
1463 (1988). For listed cases, see id. at 1463 n.124; see also, Melia v. U.S. 667 F.2d
300, 302 n.1 (2d Cir. 1981).
127. Kester, supra note 126, at 1463. Note the following statement by the De-
partment of Justice: "Many federal offences are based upon the commerce clause of
the Constitution. Regrettably these offenses are not extraditable under most treaties.
For example, the gravamen of 18 U.S.C. 2314 is interstate transportation, not theft."
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUsTICE, U.S. AttORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-15.220 (1977).
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is still necessary for the requesiing state to show that the offense is
criminal in both the requested and requesting states. In essence, the no-
list approach allows potentially more offenses to be extraditable. Of
particular note will be the inclusion of fiscal offenses, which unless pro-
vided for specifically in bilateral treaties are not extraditable at
present. 128
This approach appropriately places its concentration not on the
strict denomination of the offense but upon the conduct constituting the
criminal offense. This denomination or enumerative approach, may
vary radically between countries and even between states in a federal
system such as the United States of America. The no-list approach dic-
tates a move away from a rigid interpretation of extraditable offenses
within treaty schedules and emphasizes the conduct in question.
2. Canadian Case Law Interpreting Double Criminality
Canadian courts have long taken the position that even where
there was an applicable list of offenses appended to a treaty, it was not
necessary for the requesting state and Canada to use the same termi-
nology. Apparently, the key factor is not that both states use the same
terminology or denomination, but rather that the evidence as a whole
makes a prima facie showing that the offender has committed what
amounts to an offense in both states. In Cotroni v. A-G of Canada,129
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the test to be used is to ask
what is the essence of the offense. Accordingly, it does not matter that
the particular indictment, had it been issued in Canada, would have
been issued under the Criminal Code or any other statute. There is no
requirement of exact identity between the offense charged in the re-
questing state and the Canadian offense. The focus is on criminal
conduct.
In United States v. Smith,130 Mr. Justice Borins held that "it is
the conduct alleged against the [fugitive] which is central to the hear-
ing resulting from a request for extradition. It is the alleged criminality
128. Note, however, that this exception to extradition was recently eroded by the
House of Lords in R. v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Secretary
of State for the Home Department, [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1204 (H.L.).
129. [1976] 1 S.C.R. 219; see also In re Brisbois, 133 C.C.C. 188 (Ont. H.C.)
(1962); Virginia v. Cohen, [1973] F.C. 622.
130. 15 C.C.C. 3d 16 (1984); see also In re Smith and the Queen, 16 C.C.C. 3d
10 (1984).
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of this conduct to which attention must be paid." 13' The inquiry is not
focused on the legal framework of the requesting state. Instead, Can-
ada must fit a set of facts that constitute the conduct of the fugitive
into Canadian law in order to see whether conduct constitutes an of-
fense under that particular law.13 2 Using this "conduct" test, it is not
necessary to determine whether the requesting state can make out a
prima facie case under its criminal law. The essence is the sufficiency
of evidence in the forum.'33
The Supreme Court of Canada again had cause to deal with this
issue in Washington v. Johnson.184 In Johnson, the applicable treaty,
the 1976 Extradition Treaty between Canada and the United States,13 5
contained a list of offenses. Mr. Justice Wilson, writing for the major-
ity, stated that the issue was whether the requesting state must estab-
lish that the offense charged in the foreign state is an offense in Can-
ada or whether it is sufficient to show that the conduct charged would
have amounted to a Canadian crime, listed in the treaty, if it had oc-
curred in Canada. 36 The court noted that Article 2 of the treaty re-
quires a combination extraditable crime and double criminality, with a
minimum punishment time of one year, and held that the double crimi-
nality rule looks to the conduct of the fugitive. 3 '
The Johnson court quoted the following passage from La Forest's
Extradition To and From Canada:
An extradition crime may broadly be defined as an act of which a
person is accused, or has been convicted of having committed
within the jurisdiction of one state that constitutes a crime in that
state and in the state where that person is found, and that is men-
tioned or described in an extradition treaty between those states
under a name or description by which it is known in each state.138
It is not necessary for an exact identity between terminology in the two
states, nor for the elements of the crime to be the same in both states.
131. Smith, 15 C.C.C. 3d at 16.
132. Id.
133. See United States v. Caro-Payan, (Ont. D.C. Feb. 18, 1988) (unreported).
134. 40 C.C.C. 3d 546 (1988).
135. 1976 Extradition Treaty, Canada-United States, 27 U.S.T. 983, Can. T.S.
No. 3.
136. Johnson, 40 C.C.C. 3d at 548.
137. Id. at 553.
138. G.V. LA FOREST, supra note 17, at 42; see also SHEARER, EXTRADION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (1971).
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This would be an impossible task to accomplish.139 The focus is undeni-
ably upon the conduct of the fugitive.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal recently dealt with the in-
terplay of extraditable crime and double criminality in United States v.
McVey.140 This case involved an extradition request for the offense of
submitting false statements to the United States Customs Service. This
particular offense was not listed in the schedule to the Canada-United
States Extradition Treaty of 1976. However, the crime of forgery is
listed in the same Treaty. It was argued that the definition of forgery
was broad enough to include McVey's alleged crime. In the United
States his offense did not constitute forgery. The British Columbia
Court of Appeal, referring once again to La Forest's text,1 41 held that
the offense must be listed in the schedule to the Treaty under some
name or description by which it is known in each state.142 This case
demonstrates the need for the no-list approach to extradition, in which
the criminality of the conduct in both states is the keynote coupled with
a minimum punishability requirement. It gets away from the limiting
effect of the enumerative method. 43
None of the authorities discussed in this section so far bear di-
rectly upon this case. Although McVey's conduct was criminal in the
United States, and would have been considered criminal if it had oc-
curred in Canada, the difficult question is to decide what construction
must be placed upon Article 2 of the Treaty.144
139. See 1 H. BOOTH, supra note 5, at 50, where the author states that the
extradition court cannot "become a tribunal of foreign law." See also R. v. Governor of
Pentonville Prison ex parte Elliott, [1975] Crim. L.R. 516; R. v. Governor of
Pentonville Prison ex parte Narang, [1978] A.C. 247.
140. 33 B.C.L.R. 2d 28 (1989).
141. See supra note 138.
142. McVey, 33 B.C.L.R. 2d at 30.
143. M.C. BASSIouNI, supra note 1, at 330.
144. This Article provides as follows:
(1) Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of this Treaty
for any of the offenses listed in the Schedule annexed to this Treaty, which
is an integral part of this Treaty, provided these offenses are punishable by
the laws of both Contracting Parties by a term of imprisonment exceeding
one year.
(2) Extradition shall also be granted for attempts to commit, or conspiracy
to commit or being a party to any of the offenses listed in the annexed
Schedule.
(3) Extradition shall also be granted for any offense against a federal law
of the United States in which one of the offenses listed in the annexed
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The key question to be addressed is whether the alleged criminal
conduct in the requesting state must be enumerated in the extradition
treaty as well as the offence established by Canadian law, if it has an-
other name, or whether it is sufficient to have the dual criminality con-
ception as to the conduct present and an enumeration of the Canadian
offense in the treaty alone. In interpreting treaty articles, and attempt-
ing to shed some light on the complex double criminality issue
presented in McVey, some fairly recent cases may be of valuable guid-
ance. In United States v. Smith, 45 Mr. Justice Borins saw the need for
double criminality with respect to the fugitive's conduct and an enu-
meration of the offense in the treaty. He relied upon La Forest's Extra-
dition To and From Canada14 for the proposition that "if the act
charged falls within the definition of different crimes in the two coun-
tries, the names of the crimes in both countries must appear in the
treaty; otherwise extradition will be refused."'' 47
A second valuable case is United States v. Caro-Payan,48 which
concerned, inter alia, the question of whether a continuing criminal en-
terprise relating to drug trafficking was an extraditable offence. Mad-
ame Justice Smith's reasoning succinctly addressed the point of extra-
dition law raised in McVey and referred to the earlier case of Sudar v.
United States.4" The justice stated that "a treaty must be [given] a
liberal interpretation in working to achieve its stated ends.'1 50
Madame Justice Smith applied the British cases of Nielsen'51 and
Schedule, or made extraditable by paragraph (2) of this Article, is a sub-
stantial element, even if transporting, transportation, the use of the mails
or interstate facilities are also elements of the specific offense.
1976 Extradition Treaty, Canada-United States, art. II, 27 U.S.T., 983 Can. T.S. No.
3.
145. 15 C.C.C. 3d 16 (1984).
146. G.V. LA FOREsT, supra note 138, at 52-55.
147. Smith, 15 C.C.C. at 28. This is the line that the British Columbia Court of
Appeal took in McVey, 33 B.C.L.R. 2d 28 (1989), see supra notes 140-143 and accom-
panying text, and more recently in In re Ogoshi, No. CC891575 (British Columbia
Supreme Court Nov. 3, 1989) (unreported).
148. (Ont. D.C. Feb. 18, 1988) (unreported).
149. 39 N.R. 433 (1981).
150. Caro-Payan, (Ont. D.C. Feb. 18, 1988) (unreported). This emphasis on not
frustrating the purpose of the treaty by resorting to technical argtaments can also be
seen in the trilogy of cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada: Allard and Cha-
rette v. United States [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564; Mellino v. Argentina, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536,
and Schmidt v. United States, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500.
151. [1984] 2 W.L.R. 737.
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McCaffery,152 and held that the old double criminality test, which re-
quired an almost exact pairing of all the constituent elements of the
offense, is not the requisite test today. Instead, the conduct test should
be applied. Of the utmost relevance to the McVey issue is the state-
ment that "[t]he extradition judge need only consider whether the evi-
dence against the fugitive would justify a committal for trial if the
'conduct alleged' had been committed in Canada, and that conduct is a
crime that is listed in the Treaty. '1 53
The decision in Caro-Payan, which holds that for double criminal-
ity to be present there is no need for all the constituent elements of the
offense charged to be the same in both the requesting and requested
state, is non-controversial. Madame Justice Smith argued that "[i]t is
the conduct that must be criminal and not the offence that must be
identical in both the requested and requesting State."u5 4 She concluded
that this is a natural extension of Nielsen and McCaffery and is "to-
tally consistent" with the observations of La Forest in Extradition to
and From Canada.55
Madame Justice Smith seems to be holding that as long as the
conduct would be criminal if committed in Canada, and if that conduct
is a listed crime in the treaty, then there is no necessity for it to be also
referred to in the treaty list under a name by which it is known in the
requesting state. This point is re-emphasized further in the same case
where she states:
It is no longer necessary for the extradition judge to determine
whether a "continuing criminal enterprise", as alleged in Count 1
of the Requesting State's indictment, is an offence known in Can-
ada. Rather the question is whether the "conduct" alleged against
the fugitive would, if committed in Canada, constitute a crime
that is listed in the Schedule of offences to the Extradition
Treaty.1 5
6
This view would appear to go against the grain of La Forest's
statement that if the "act charged amounted [to different offenses in
the requesting and requested states], both crimes would have to be
152. [1984] 1 W.W.R. 867.
153. Caro-Payan, (Ont. D.C. Feb. 18, 1988) (unreported).
154. Id.
155. Id.; see G.V. LA FOREST, supra note 138, at 57.
156. Caro-Payan, (Ont. D.C. Feb. 18, 1988) (unreported) (emphasis added).
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listed in the treaty before extradition would be granted."' 17 The McVey
and Ogoshi courts relied upon La Forest's statement, but however
much assistance a doctrinal view may be, it is clearly not binding on
the courts. There must be a primary interpretation of the sections of
the statute and articles of the treaty. As indicated earlier, there is a
good argument to be made that Article 2(1) of the 1976 Extradition
Treaty does not require the offense to be listed under names by which
it is known in both states.158
The third case is particularly relevant because it is factually simi-
lar to McVey. In United States v. Golitschek,59 Madame Justice
Smith held, similar to her holding in Caro-Payan, that the essence of
double criminality is conduct-based. In Golitschek, the fugitive was al-
leged to have conspired with others outside of the United States to pro-
cure ten military helicopters and to take them outside of the United
States to a state to which export under United States law is prohib-
ited.60 In order to accomplish this export, the fugitive and others pro-
duced and submitted a false document (end-user certificate) to obtain
the required license to export from the United States Government.161
Madame Justice Smith held that the essence of the offense was a
conspiracy to obtain an export license by false pretenses or by false
statement.162 Canada utilizes extra-territorial jurisdiction over conspir-
acies pursuant to section 423(4) of the Criminal Code and the sub-
stance of the conspiracy would give rise to the offense of obtaining by
false pretenses, (section 321(a)), forgery or making false documents,
(section 324(1)), uttering a false document, (section 325), and making
false statements to obtain an export license under the Export and Im-
port Permits Act.6 3 Thus, the fugitive's conduct would be capable of
157. G.V. LA FOREST, supra note 138, at 56-57.
158. See supra notes 140-157 and accompanying text.
159. (Ont. D.C. January 1986) (unreported). Golitschek was extradited to the
United States and was prosecuted and found guilty in March 1986.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. The false pretence was contained in the end-user certificate which indi-
cated the helicopters were going to Spain rather than Iran. The essence of the second
offense was conspiracy to forge or make false documents, based on the facts that if
documents were presented to the U.S. authorities certifying that ths helicopters were
going to Spain so that they could effect an export to Iran, it would be by means of a
false document. Id.
163. Madame Justice Smith refers to the Import and Export Act, section 16.
This appears to be in error. I assume that she meant section 17 of the above named
statute, dealing with false and misleading information and misrepresentation. See
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prosecution in Canada if Canada was in the position of the United
States.
Madame Justice Smith went on to hold that this conduct on the
part of the fugitive was covered by several offenses listed in the sched-
ule of offenses appended to the Treaty, namely Numbers 12 (obtaining
property, money or valuable security by false pretences), 17 (offenses
against the laws relating to forgery), and 19 (making of false affidavit
or statutory declaration for afty extrajudicial purpose). Article 2(2) of
the Treaty stipulates that conspiracy to commit any of these7 offenses is
also extraditable.'" In addition, Count 2 on the extradition indictment
alleged a conspiracy to obtain an export license by false pretenses using
the telephone and telex.16 5 Although there is no precise Canadian
equivalent to fraud or obtaining property by wire, Madame Justice
Smith emphasized that it is the underlying conduct covered by the
Treaty which must be considered. In this case, it was the use of false
pretenses to obtain an export license and the method by which the par-
ticular crime was executed was not relevant. Therefore, this offense was
covered by Number 12 of the Schedule of Offences.
Madame Justice Smith concluded that the conduct on all counts
would give rise to criminal offenses in Canada and all were listed in the
Treaty. It is important to note that she did not discuss the issue raised
in McVey, which was that in the United States the offense did not con-
stitute forgery.16 6 She did not question that the Schedule encompassed
the offenses on the extradition indictment. As discussed earlier, this ap-
proach is the one that seems to be in keeping with the purpose behind
the extradition process. The rights of the fugitive are safeguarded, as
he or she will not be extradited unless the conduct is considered crimi-
nal in both states and is punishable by a term of imprisonment exceed-
ing one year pursuant to Article 2(1) of the Treaty.
This provision is supplemented by Article 10, which requires that
the evidence must be sufficient to justify committal for trial if the of-
fense had been committed in the territory of the requested state. 67 The
important question raised is why the McVey court, which failed to look
R.S.C. 1985, ch. E-19.
164. 1976 Extradition Treaty, Canada-United States, art. II, section 1, 27
U.S.T. 983, Can. T.S. No. 3.
165. Golitschek, (Ont. D.C. January 1986) (unreported).
166. See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
167. 1976 Extradition Treaty, Canada-United States, art X, 27 U.S.T. 983, Can.
T.S. No. 3.
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beyond the crime of "forgery" as listed in the Treaty, did not consider
the "false pretenses" possibility as the Golitschek court did.
The same approach utilized in Golitschek was also taken by the
Superior Court of Quebec in United States v. Meredith,65 where Mr.
Justice Hannan held that the nature and type of crime in the U.S.
indictment, obtaining goods using false pretenses, was recognized in
Canada. He argued as follows:
If the conduct of the accused, had it been committed in Canada
would give rise to offences in Canada, and these offences are
caught in the net of criminal offences covered by the Treaty, then
the conduct with which the accused is charged as being an offence
in the United States is an extradition offence. It is not the title of
the offence which is important but rather the essential element, so
that an offence may be subject to the treaty because of its essential
elements though it not be there mentioned by name.169
In assessing the position taken by Canadian courts, it is clear that
the case law stresses an interpretation of treaty obligations that is lib-
eral and fair and gives effect to Canada's international obligations. It is
also clear that section 2 of the Extradition Act has been interpreted to
mean that the conduct must be viewed as criminal, if it had occurred in
Canada. Section 2 allows for extradition as long as the "Canadian ver-
sion" of the criminal conduct amounting to an offense is "described" in
a "list-treaty." Section 3 of the Extradition Act provides that in the
event of inconsistency between the Act and the extradition arrange-
ment, the arrangement will govern and the Act must be so read and
construed. It is therefore necessary to look at Canada's bilateral ar-
rangements on a treaty by treaty basis. The 1976 Extradition Treaty
with the United States is for obvious geographical reasons the most
utilized and is the one at issue in the recent McVey case.
When the wording of Article 2, (1) of the 1976 Extradition Treaty
is examined, it can be readily divided into two distinct parts: (1) per-
sons shall be extradited according to the provisions of this Treaty for
any of the offenses listed in the Schedule annexed to the Treaty, which
is an integral part of this Treaty; and (2) these listed offenses must be
punishable by the laws of both contracting parties by a term of impris-
onment of no less than one year.170
168. No. 500-27-004092-872 (Que. S.C. Sept. 4, 1987) (unreported).
169. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
170. 1976 Extradition Treaty, Canada-United States, art. I, section 1, 27
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As indicated above, there may be no need for the denomination of
the offense to be the same in the requesting and requested state.1 71
Similarly, the scope of liability need not be co-extensive. It is enough
for the extradition process that the offense charged is considered to be
criminal conduct in both states. The intention of the parties to the
treaty was to extradite on the basis of reciprocity and the second part
of Article 2 (1) should be read in this light. There should be a fair and
liberal interpretation of extradition treaties that will not hinder the
working and narrow the operation of the arrangement.
The word "offences" utilized in Article 2 (1) of the Treaty should
be read to mean "conduct," and any "conduct" listed in the treaty
should be extraditable, provided the conduct is considered criminal in
both states and both states have a minimum punishability for it of at
least one year. This would seem to fit well within the analysis of recent
Canadian and British decisions considered earlier. It should also be rec-
ognized that in determining the extraditable nature of the crime, it is
necessary pursuant to Article 9(3) of the 1976 Extradition Treaty to
provide that there is "such evidence, as according to the terms of the
requested State, would justify his arrest and committal for trial if the
offence had been committed there .. .. 1"'7 This is a safeguard for the
fugitive - extradition will not be granted for acts not considered crimi-
nal conduct in both states or where there is an insufficiency of evidence.
The basis for these Articles is found in section 18 of the Extradition
Act.17 3
This issue of double criminality interfaces with the principle of
specialty, which holds that a person extradited shall not be tried or
punished in the requesting state for an offense other than that for
which extradition has been granted.17 4 It is important to note here that
the specialty principle is linked to the rigid approach of non-extradition
U.S.T. 983, Can. T.S. No. 3.
171. See Johnson, 40 C.C.C. 3d at 546, discussed supra notes 134-139 and ac-
companying text; Smith, 15 C.C.C. 3d at 16, discussed supra notes 145-147 and ac-
companying text; Caro-Payan, (Ont. D.C. Feb. 18, 1988) (unreported), discussed
supra notes 148-158 and accompanying test; Meredith, No. 500-27-0004092-872 (Que.
S.C. Sept. 4, 1987) (unreported), discussed supra notes 168-169 and accompanying
text.
172. 1976 Extradition Treaty, Canada-United States, art. IX, 27 U.S.T. 983,
Can T.S. No. 3 (emphasis added).
173. Extradition Act, 1989, ch. 33, § 18.
174. 1976 Extradition Treaty, Canada-United States, art. XII, 27 U.S.T. 983,
Can. T.S. No. 3.
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adopted by the McVey court.175 However, if a rigid, technical interpre-
tation is to be made of Article 2 (1) of the Treaty, it would result in
complex difficulties concerning criminal conduct. Several questions
have arisen over the last decade with respect to whether double crimi-
nality may be achieved when dealing with foreign legislation that has
no exact Canadian counterpart.
To use current examples, would offenses under the United States'
laws such as RICO 17 and CCE177 find equivalents under Canadian
criminal law? Assume the 1976 Treaty is strictly interpreted and extra-
dition could only take place for "forgery." If the conduct in the U.S.
would not be prosecuted as "forgery" under the U.S. Code and other
legislation, would this result in a violation of the specialty principle?
The British Columbia Supreme Court, in the habeas corpus application
in In re McVey, 7 8 held that the specialty principle would indeed be
violated. Again, this type of analysis would seem to be artificial and
defeat the purpose of the Treaty. The cornerstone of the Treaty is reci-
procity and recognition by both states of the fact that the alleged con-
duct is criminal. To put up these technical roadblocks hobbles the effi-
cacy of the whole process. Additionally, it should be noted that when
Canada extradites for an offense listed in the Treaty, the requesting
state may well be prosecuting under a different technical name. How-
ever, the emphasis always remains upon the conduct for which the ex-
tradition was granted; unrelated offenses allegedly committed before
the extradition was granted are not included. As Mr. Justice La Forest
stated in Parisien v. The Queen,'79 a state to which a request for extra-
dition is presented is under no 'obligation to surrender the fugitive for
prosecution in the requesting state "for behaviour not considered crimi-
nal in the requested state."'180 This is the basic principle upon which
the process is founded, as expressed in the maxim nulla poena sine
lege, - "no punishment without law."
In the case of Sudar v. United States,'8' the Ontario High Court
held that extradition on charges of racketeering and conspiracy to rack-
eteer could take place. It based this holding on the following rationale:
175. See supra notes 140-147 and accompanying text.
176. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (1962).
177. Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (1970).
178. 30 B.C.L.R. 2d 197 (1988).
179. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 950.
180. Id. at 956-57.
181. 39 N.R. 433 (1981).
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[T]he only real substantive components of the indictment against
Sudar for the purposes of extradition are the conspiracy. . . and
the activities of murder, threats to murder etc. There is no doubt as
to the criminality of these activities and of any conspiracy in rela-
tion thereto. They are recognized as such the world over.1 82
This appears to be an approach based upon conduct rather than de-
nomination.183 It was not necessary to find that the acts charged in the
United States were also set forth in the Treaty. The basic problem is
whether the extradition is granted for the offenses as named under the
United States statute, or whether extradition is granted by the extradi-
tion court because the offenses are considered criminal in Canada. If
the result is that the crimes are those articulated by the court, then any
prosecution in the United States under a special statute would violate
the principle of specialty. Canada extradited for the criminal conduct
involved - conspiracy, murder, threats of murder, arson and extortion.
All of these offenses are listed in the Treaty. However, Sudar was in-
dicted in the United States and eventually prosecuted under RICO.
A similar situation arose in the Australian case of Riley v. Com-
monwealth,184 in which the fugitives were sought by the United States
for the offence of continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) under 21
U.S.C. § 848.185 The fugitives were involved in a series of offenses re-
garding importation and possession for the purpose of distributing a
narcotic.1 8 6 The Australian court addressed the issue of whether CCE
was an extraditable offense under the 1976 Treaty between Australia
and the United States.18 7 The schedule of offences appended to the
Treaty had no CCE offense. However, the court assessed whether the
182. Id.
183. For a criticism of the Sudar decision, see Bernholz, Bernholz & Herman,
International Extradition in Drug Cases, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. AND COMM. REG. 353
(1985), in which the authors argue that "the determination whether [CCE] . is rec-
ognized as punishable in the requested state must be made with reference to CCE as a
whole and not its separate parts. Extradition is sought, granted or denied on the basis
of the overall crime." Id. at 36. The authors also suggest that "[w]hen the elements of
CCE are combined, it is clear that the offence is an exclusive genus of United States
criminal law. Because it is not punishable in foreign countries, it cannot satisfy double
criminality, and thus, does not qualify as an extraditible offence." Id.
184. 60 A.L.J.R. 106 (Austl. 1985).
185. Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1970).
186. Riley, 60 A.L.J.R. 106.
187. 1976 Extradition Treaty, Australia-United States, 27 U.S.T. 957, TIAS
8234.
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acts composing the CCE offense would be considered criminal in Aus-
tralia if committed there. The court found that the conduct would have
been criminal if committed in Australia, and concluded that the CCE
offense was extraditable, even though an exact parallel did not exist
under Australian law.188 As to the issue of double criminality, the court
reasoned that "because at least one act which formed an element of the
offence of continuing enterprise, or an equivalent act, would have con-
stituted an offence against a law . . . if it had occurred in New South
Wales, the offence itself is an extradition crime."' 189
In the British case United States v. McCaffery,190 the United
States sought extradition for federal offenses which consisted of using
wire, radio, or television to transmit communications for fraudulent
purposes in interstate or foreign commerce and of knowing transporta-
tion of a stolen security in interstate or foreign commerce. The House
of Lords had to address the issue that there was no English equivalent
to the charges. Following the decision in Nielsen,1 91 the court held that
the offense was extraditable and applied the test enunciated in Nielsen,
which stated that what must be considered "was whether the conduct
of the accused, if it had been committed in England, would have consti-
tuted a crime falling within one or more descriptions in that list.119 2
In Hagerman v. United States,193 CCE was once again under re-
view. This particular crime is unknown to Canadian law. Mr. Justice
McKenzie held that the intent of Article 2(3) of the 1976 Extradition
Act was to create a new extradition crime category if it "fits the
description of possessing as a substantial element a listed federal of-
fence or one listed under art. 2(3) . . .,. The thrust of the judg-
ment seems to be that Article 2(3) was aimed at giving greater scope
for extraditable crimes "even though they might possess the purely
American characteristic of requiring transporting, transportation, the
use of the mails in interstate facilities."'1 9 What Mr. Justice McKenzie
sought was (1) an offense against the federal law of the United States;
and (2) a substantial element of that offense must be one of the of-
188. Riley, 60 A.L.J.R. at 106.
189. Id. at 109.
190. [1984] 2 All E.R. 570.
191. [1984] 2 All E.R. 81. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Nielsen.
192. McCaffery, [1984] 2 All E.R. at 573; see Nielsen, 2 [1984] All E.R. at 573.
193. 44 C.C.C. 3d 157 (1988).
194. Id. at 162.
195. Id.
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fenses listed in the schedule to the Treaty.""8
V. DOUBLE CRIMINALITY AND DUALITY OF JURISDICTIONAL
BASES
One issue still to be addressed is the impact of assertions through
domestic law of extraterritorial jurisdiction over criminal offenses and
how this interacts with double criminality. As emphasized earlier, it is
essential that the requested state views the offense for which extradi-
tion is sought as extraditable. 9 7 Here, the principles of jurisdiction over
the offense are crucial. 198 If an extradition treaty provides for crimes
which are considered extraditable crimes if committed within the re-
questing state's jurisdiction, then, as La Forest stated, "[g]enerally
...it seems best to interpret jurisdiction generously. This is in fact
what has happened. In practice whether the term 'territory' or 'juris-
diction' is used in the Treaty, jurisdiction has been broadly
construed."1 99
This matter of double criminality and extraterritoriality has be-
come increasingly important as crime has become more transnational
in nature. Many of Canada's more recent extradition treaties provide
that when the offense for which extradition is sought was committed
outside of the territory of the requesting state, the requested state shall
have the power to grant extradition if the laws of the requested state
also provide for jurisdiction in similar circumstances. 00 Other treaties
go further and provide that even when the requested state does not use
196. Id. at 165. The scheduled offense does not have to be identical to the U.S.
federal law that forms a substantial element. Id.
197. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text for the discussion on extra-
territoriality and the 1989 British Extradition Act.
198. For an in depth analysis of this issue, see SA. WILLIAMS & J.G. CASTEL,
CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS, chs. 1-5
(1981); see also van den Wyngaert, Double Criminality as a Requirement to Jurisdic-
tion, in DOUBLE CRIMINALITY: STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 43, 46 (N.
Jareborg ed. 1989).
199. G.V. LA FOREST, supra note 138, at 45.
200. See e.g., 1976 Extradition Treaty, Canada-United States, art. II, § 3, 27
U.S.T. 983, Can. T.S. No. 3; Extradition Treaty between Canada and India, art II,
February 6, 1987; Treaty of Extradition between Canada and the United Mexican
States, art XI, § 2, January 24, 1990; Extradition Treaty between Canada and the
Republic of the Philippines, November 7, 1989; (no extradition without duality of juris-
dictional basis).
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a similar extraterritorial basis, extradition may be granted. 201
One of Canada's newest treaties with the United Mexican States
also provides specifically for ,the use of the active nationality basis of
jurisdiction. 2  The 1988 Treaty between Canada and France is worded
differently. It states in Article 6(1) that extradition may not be refused
if the offense for which extradition is sought was committed in whole or
in part in the territory of the requested state or elsewhere subject to its
jurisdiction.20 3 Moreover, Article 6(2) stipulates that extradition "may
not be refused when the offence was committed outside the territory of
the requesting state unless the legislation of the requested state does
not authorize prosecution of the same offence . . . in corresponding
circumstances. 20 4
Similarly, the European Convention on Extradition provides in
Article 7(2) that extradition may be refused, even though the offense is
extraditable under the Convention, if the offense was committed other
than in the territory of the requesting state and the requested state
does not utilize a similar extraterritorial basis of jurisdiction.20 5
Clearly, where both requested and requesting states utilize the same
extraterritorial basis of jurisdiction over the offense, no problem is
presented. The difficulty arises when the jurisdictional basis is not rec-
ognized by the requested state. 0 6 In such a case, unless 'the treaty pro-
vides specifically for extradition, double criminality will not be satisfied
and extradition will be refused.0 7 One concern underlying this limita-
tion is that a requesting state may seek extradition of a national of the
requested state on a "theory of liability that the requested state finds
troubling. o20 8
An interesting case dealing with the interface lb etween double
201. See Protocol Amending the Treaty on Extradition between the United
States and Canada, art. III. This protocol is not yet in force.
202. Treaty of Extradition between Canada and the United Mexican States, Jan-
uary 24, 1990.
203. Extradition Treaty between the Government of Canadl, and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of France, art VI, § 1, Nov. 17, 1988.
204. Id. at art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added).
205. European Convention on Extradition, 1957, art. VII, § 2, E.T.S. No. 24.
206. See Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction
over Extraterritorial Crimes, 4 UTAH L. REv. 685, 744 (1984). Th e author labels this
a "special use" of double criminality.
207. The United States recognizes this "special use" of double criminality. Id.
208. M. Tigar, The Extradition Requirement of Double Criminality in Complex
Cases: Illustrating the Rationale of Extradition 14 (December 1989) (unpublished pa-
per presented at Conference on Extradition, Siracusa, Sicily).
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criminality and basis of jurisdiction is France v. Moghadam, °9 in
which France sought the extradition of Moghadam, a United States
resident, for complicity in an agreement to import heroin into France.
The court addressed the subject of double criminality and extraterrito-
riality and determined on the facts of the case "that the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction [by the United States] over Moghadam
(under analagous circumstances) would be unreasonable. Hence the re-
quirements of dual criminality are not met. . . [T]he extraterritorial
exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. ' 210
A commentator has argued that "[o]ne reason for prohibiting
prosecution of those who have never physically entered the forum state
is that legal remedies differ, and that such differences lead us to doubt
whether an accused acted with enough knowledge, intent or desire to
make inculpation reasonable. 21 Many states with whom Canada has
extradition arrangements use the active nationality basis and it seems
to be "in the interests of justice" and also in the interests of Canada to
extradite in these circumstances to the state of nationality of the
fugitive. 12
In this era of increasing transnational and international crime,
where a state's citizens may be victims of criminal offenses organized
abroad, such as fraud or drug smuggling, it is reasonable and appropri-
ate to bring a more relaxed view to this jurisdictional question. As long
as the conduct can be considered criminal if committed in the re-
quested state, then this should be sufficient. The duality of jurisdic-
tional bases should not be paramount.1
The only caveat would be that such extraterritorial jurisdiction
should be in accordance with international law. 14 Reciprocity on a
strict basis would thwart the efficacy of the extradition process. As
Canada's criminal jurisdiction is fairly conservative, based to the great-
est extent on the territorial principle contained in section 6(2) of the
Criminal Code,215 unless specifically extended by other sections of the
209. 617 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
210. Id. at 786-87.
211. M. Tigar, supra note 208, at 15.
212. See REPORT, supra note 43, at 18; see also section 2(3) of the new British
Extradition Act, discussed supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
213. See REPORT, supra note 43, at 17.
214. Id. at 18.
215. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. ch. C-46, § (6)(2) (19___). See Libman
v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 for an interpretation of section 6(2) of the Criminal
Code.
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Code or other Act of Parliament, Canada would be unduly limiting the
possibility of extradition, even where the actual conduct is viewed as
criminal and where there is a sufficiency of evidence. It does not seem
that Canada views the use by other states of other bases of jurisdiction,
such as active nationality, as being untenable or unjust. Indeed, in
some limited circumstances concerning international crimes, stricto
sensu, such as hijacking, hostage-taking, attacks on internationally pro-
tected persons and war crimes, Canada now utilizes this approach.216
VI. THE FUTURE: A NEW CANADIAN EXTRADITION ACT AND
A REFORMULATION OF DOUBLE CRIMINALITY
In the early sections of this article, the basic distinction between
extradition to "foreign" states and rendition to Commonwealth states
was mentioned.217 Rendition under the Canadian Fugitive Offenders
Act2 18 is based upon Britain's now long repealed 1881 Fugitive Offend-
ers Act. 19 Extradition is dealt with under the Extradition Act,22 as
supplemented or amended by bilateral treaties.22' As this article is de-
voted to the principle of double criminality, it is beyond its scope to
consider all of the differences between the two Acts and how they could
be melded into one composite approach. It would also be beyond the
present article to canvass all the views on whether rendition merits
treatment separate from extradition. The last section has three pur-
poses: (1) to detail succinctly the basic reasoning between different
treatment of fugitives under the two schemes; (2) to analyze the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights arguments that a fugitive under the present Fu-
gitive Offenders Act could raise if treated differently; and (3) to make
some suggestions based on the comparisons drawn above for a new
composite Act.
The Fugitive Offenders Act imposes few of the traditional extradi-
216. See Criminal Code of Canada, C.R.S. ch. C-46, §§ 7(3), (3.1), (3.5), (3.7),(3.71) (19-).
217. See supra Part II.
218. Fugitive Offenders Act, R.S.C. ch. F-32 (1985).
219. Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, 44 & 45 Vict., ch. 69, replaced by Fugitive
Offenders Act, 1967, oh. 68, and Extradition Act, 1989, oh. 33. La Forest points out
that "[t]he repeal of the British Act by Great Britain in 1967 has no effect in Canada
because of the Statute of Westminster." See G.V. LA FOREST, supra note 138, at 153
n.1.
220. Extradition Act, R.S.C. ch. E-23 (1985).
221. Id. at § 3.
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tion law safeguards, such as the specialty principle or the double crimi-
nality requirement. There are no treaties and no list of offenses ap-
pended to the Act itself. The omission of these formal safeguards
clearly illustrates the differing principles and assumptions upon which
intra-Commonwealth rendition was conceived and has operated. Since
Canada was originally a part of the British Empire, it appeared that
rigid extradition formality was unnecessary. Although a fugitive might
be surrendered from one part of the Empire to another, he or she never
officially left the jurisdiction of the highest appellate court, the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council.222
Some earlier court decisions clearly reflect this rationale. In In re
Harrison,223 the court commented that "[i]t is quite obvious that some
additional care ought to be taken in the case of extraditing persons to
foreign countries than in facilitating criminal proceedings in the vari-
ous parts of the Empire, to which alone the Fugitive Offenders Act
applies."'22' The New Zealand Supreme Court expressed a similar opin-
ion in Ex parte Lillywhite,225 where Justice Stout argued as follows:
At common law there was thought to be an asylum for foreign of-
fenders; and it is only by virtue of treaties that foreign offenders
are given up. The rendition of an offender against the Crown from
one portion of the possessions of the Crown to another portion
should, it seems to me, be differently viewed. 228
Bearing in mind the change from Empire to Commonwealth and
the resulting change in constitutional status of the member countries,
many questions arose as to whether the Fugitive Offenders Act was
appropriate and whether it still applied to all Commonwealth states.27
Another aspect of international life that cannot be ignored is that there
has been a diminution of shared political and social objectives of the
member states. The overall complexion of the Commonwealth has dras-
222. See O'Higgins, Recent Practice under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1965
CRnm. L. Rnv. 133.
223. 25 B.C.R. 433 (1918).
224. Id. at 437.
225. 19 N.Z.L.R. 502 (1901).
226. Id. at 505.
227. The current Canadian Fugitive Offenders Act applies to any part of Her
Majesty's Realms and Territories. See Fugitive Offenders Act, R:S.C. ch. F-32 §§ 2 &
3 (1985). If this is correctly interpreted as meaning those countries that recognize the
Queen as the head of state, there are a number of Commonwealth countries to which
rendition is not possible.
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tically changed since 1881. The constituent members are not aligned on
all issues, and certainly Great Britain no longer exercises dominion and
control. For most of the countries, appeal to the Privy Cduncil no
longer exists.
In 1966 a Commonwealth Conference was held in London, Eng-
land, and the problems concerning rendition were discussed. Following
this meeting, the United Kingdom enacted a new Fugitive Offenders
Act,228 as did several other Commonwealth states, excluding Canada.
The 1967 Act provided that intra-Commonwealth rendition would be
conducted basically in the same manner as extradition, including such
safeguards as double criminality.
Concerning double criminality and the lack thereof in the Cana-
dian Fugitive Offenders Act as it still exists, G.V. La Forest made the
following statement:
The act charged need not be an offence in Canada, let alone pun-
ishable by imprisonment with hard labour [see s. 4]. That is what
makes the situations described above so difficult. The question
whether a man should be surrendered from Canada should depend
primarily on the seriousness with which the crime is regarded here,
not in the foreign country. When the British Statute on which the
Canadian Act is modelled was passed, the British Government
could control the punishment inflicted for offences by virtue of dis-
allowing and reserving colonial legislation as well as by statute of
the Imperial Parliament. That situation is now largely of the
past.229
Section 17 of the present Canadian Fugitive Offenders Act provides for
situations where rendition may be refused because it would be un-
just.23 0 However, as La Forest suggests,"that section . . . should not be
expected to bear the whole burden of what has now become an obsolete
and defective piece of legislation. 9231
In 1978, Bill S-9 was introduced in Canada to bring into operation
a new Fugitive Offenders Act. 2 It provided for rendition for crimes
falling within a schedule of offenses appended to it. This schedule and
228. Fugitive Offenders Act, 1967, ch. 68.
229. G.V. LA FOREST, supra note 138, at 157 (footnotes omitted).
230. Fugitive Offenders Act, R.S.C. ch. F-32 § 17 (1985).
231. G.V. LA FOREST, supra note 17, at 157 (emphasis added); see also id. at
166-69.
232. 30th Parliament, 4th Sess. 1978-79.
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the one belonging to the proposed amended Extradition Act were to be
the same. The idea of "returnable offence," mentioned in section 2(1)
of Bill S-9, in effect established a double criminality requirement. This
legislation would have brought Canada into line with the United King-
dom and other Commonwealth countries such as Australia. Unfortu-
nately, it died on the order paper. However, in 1981 two writers com-
menting on the demise of Bill S-9 stated that "[w]ithout a doubt a new
bill will be introduced soon which will cover the same ground. This
may be done in the same form as the previous attempt or it is sug-
gested the present system of extradition and rendition may be com-
bined in one statute. 2 3
Ten years later, in 1991, it is clear that Canada's extradition and
rendition laws are still in need of change. It is equally clear that the
changing international climate dictates that the same basic approach to
extradition should be taken with respect to all countries, Common-
wealth or otherwise. As for the double criminality requirement, the
Law Reform Commission of Canada mentioned in 1984 that there are
two Acts which, "for 'extradition' purposes, hold that the conduct in
question must amount to a criminal offence under the law of both the
requesting state and Canada, [but] do not make this a requirement for
'rendition' where an offence against the requesting state law
suffices. 234
The same Working Paper made the following observation:
[W]e have seen enough to convince us of the need to modernize our
statutes concerning these subjects. However, before that can be
done, the federal government will have to seek answers to questions
such as ... Does Canada need two Acts? Would not one suffice?
Is there any longer a need to differentiate between "extradition"
and "rendition?" 235
Finally, the Law Reform Commission recommended that "the Extradi-
tion Act and Fugitive Offenders Act be amended to provide for uni-
formity of treatment of persons under both Acts. ' 236
The Charter of Rights has since 1982 played a large part in as-
233. SA WILLIAMS & J.G. CASTEL, supra note 198, at
341.
234. WORKING P"AER 37, LAW REFORM, COMMISSION OF CANADA, EXTRATERRI-
TORIAL JURISDIcrION 136 (1984).
235. Id. at 137.
236. Id. at 137.
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sessing Canada's extradition legislation, but this is not the place to re-
count this case law history. Nevertheless, based on what has already
been said on the need to treat fugitives in the rendition process in the
same way as fugitives in the extradition process, many sections of the
Charter clearly apply.237
Separate and apart from the issue of modernizing the rendition
and extradition processes by amalgamating them within one statute,
there is the question of whether right now the Fugitive Offenders Act
violates the Charter of Rights by not allowing for the principle of
double criminality. Are fugitive offenders being denied fundamental
justice and being subjected to inequality before and under the law?
Why should X, being surrendered to Great Britain, not have the same
safeguards as Y, being extradited to the United States or Germany?
It is far from surprising that such a Charter argument was raised
in the case of The Queen v. Taylor.288 Taylor argued, inter alia, that
under the Fugitive Offenders Act his Charter Rights - guaranteed by
sections 7 and 15239 - had been violated, in that the offense for which
the requesting state asked for his rendition was not be an offense under
Canadian Criminal law, as contrasted with the double criminality safe-
guard of the current Extradition Act. Mr. Justice Scullion held that
there was no such breach of his rights under the Charter "so funda-
mental as to cause [him] to declare the [Fugitive Offenders Act] or
parts thereof of no force and effect under section 52 of the Charter. '240
Based on the foregoing analysis, including Justice La Forest state-
ment that the Fugitive Offenders Act is "an obsolete and defective
piece of legislation, '24 1 it is remarkable that Mr. Justice Scullion in
1988 was able to come to the conclusion that there is no need for the
same safeguards in rendition as in extradition. To illustrate this, he
refers to the need for safeguards when extraditing to a country where
the laws and judicial system are fundamentally different, as opposed to
rendition to a Commonwealth country sharing "a grea:t deal in that
237. See Part I, Constitution Act, 1982, which is Schedule B, Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), ch. 11. § VII (right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice);
§ XV (equality before and under the law; equal protection and equal benefit of the law
without discrimination) (1982).
238. (1988) [Ont. Prov. Ct.].
239. See supra note 237.
240. Taylor, (1988) [Ont. Prov. Ct.] at 10.
241. G.V. LA FOREST, supra note 138, at 157; see also R. v. Governor of Brixton
Prison, ex parte Rush, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 165.
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common legal and political heritage."242
Although in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries this may
have been true, it is submitted that it is not so today, as evidenced by
the perceived need for the safeguards in the 1967 Commonwealth
Scheme. However, Mr. Justice Scullion seems to be unaware that Can-
ada stands in almost splendid isolation in clinging to the nineteenth
century approach to rendition. As Aronson indicated,24 3 Canada would
not get the same treatment from Great Britain if the shoe was on the
other foot! Although the Commonwealth Law Ministers have recently
considered a modification of the Rendition Scheme of 1967, the con-
centration appears to be on the prima facie case question, not on
double criminality.
In conclusion, it is submitted that a new Canadian Extradition Act
should be drafted that would combine extradition and rendition. The
present scheme of two separate statutes no longer fits modern realities.
The time is ripe for reform. Without addressing the issue of whether
treaties should be entered into with Commonwealth countries as with
other foreign states, or whether they may simply be designated, the
section listing crimes that are extraditable should utilize the conduct
approach,244 coupled with a minimum punishability requirement. This
revision would allow for a more flexible approach and yet still offer the
fugitive the appropriate safeguards that are necessary.
242. Taylor, (1988) [Ont. Prov. Ct.].
243. See supra notes 70-77 for a discussion of the Aronson case.
244. See supra notes 65-79, 110-127, 129-173.
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